Epistemology — 134A — Clarke — Wrigley
Final Examination — Eric Wasiolek

Outline:

Part I.

A. The Austinian Critical Position in detail

B. The Phenomenological Critical Position in detail

C. Comparison of the Austinian and the Phenomenological Critiques

D. Evaluation of the Austinian and the Phenomenological Critiques

E. Comparative Evaluation of the Austinians and the Phenomenologists

Part II.

A. The breakdown in Lewis

1. Gen. Explan. 'The Biconditional'
2. Problem #1
3. Problem #2
4. Problem #3
5. Problem #4

B. The Significance of Lewis' Breakdown on Contemporary Epistemology: The C.S. Philosophers

C. Addendum: Notes on Lewis' modified Thesis of Objective Reality

Whew!

For purposes of brevity and clarity, I have partially symbolized my responses.

e.g. = example
$\exists$ = there is
$\sim$ = not
negates (e.g. $\sim\exists$ = there aren't)
($\sim(x)$, x is not the case)
~1. negates a point
T.J./non T.J. = terminating judgement
1. = point number 1
*1. = conclusion
$\Longrightarrow$ = cause
// = against, versus, distinguished from
|| = parallel to
$\approx$ = similar to like, as
$\therefore$ = therefore
V.E. = veridical experience
D.E. = delussory experience
$\emptyset$ = none
Δ = change
(x, Δx = changed x)
(Δ's = vb. = changes)
Subj = subject
m = material thing
P.C. = Perceptual Consciousness
$\psi\phi$ = psychophysical)

i.e., = in other words
T.E. = traditional epistemologist
Ph. = Phenomenolog(ist (ical (y)
A = Austin
s.d. = sense datum
per = perceive perceive
per cont. = perceptually contined
C.S. = Common Sense
p.o. = physical object
ontol = ontological
pos = position
w/ = with
Q = question
Q's = (vb.) questions (noun) "
T = true
F = false
$\rightarrow$ = if ... then
o.p.w. = objective public world
s.th something
'= k' = is constant doesn't vary
p.r. = percept. realist.

PART I.

(A) Austin's critique of T.E.

Motivation: Deflation of C.S. in Lewis' phenomenal empiricism / the paradoxicality of T.E.'s conclu. that ① we are per. cont. to s.d. and the problem 1) entails, ② How can we know an obj. pub. world on the basis of what we per. (just s.d.)

Austin's conception of the T.E.'s position:

to accept ∃ s.d. is to accept Cartesian represen



A understand's s.d. barrier to have ontological status

Austin's conception of the problem w/ T.E.'s pos:

pretace: 1) above divides into (1a) ∃ s.d. and (1b) we are per. cont. to s.d. (= all we per. are s.d.)

Austin ~~rejects 1a~~, conceives of Q as whether ∃ s.d. at all. (Q's 1a.) ✓

Austin's strategy for criticizing the T.E.'s pos:

1a) ∃ s.d.'s → T.E. doctrine is T
~1a) ~∃ s.d.'s → T.E. " " F

Also, since s.d.'s = ontol. barrier (by Cartes. Rep.)

∃ s.d.'s → we're per. cont. to s.d.'s
∴ (by modus tollens)

~1b → ~1a) ~ (we're per cont to s.d.'s) → ~∃ ontol. barrier, ~∃ s.d.'s

and, behold!, the T.E. prob 2) dissolves:

~∃ s.d.'s → (~2) we can know o.p.w. directly on basis of what we per. (p.o.'s)

Austin's Argument // T.E. in detail

What is T.E.'s meθ of discov. s.d.'s?

1. external observation
2. internal bodily attention (as trying to feel digestion)

* ~1.∧~2.) closer and closer scrutiny reveals more info., but reveals no s.d.'s, i.e., it's not obvious thru this examination that s.d.'s are 'atoms' of which p.o.'s are composed

3. Theoretical Analysis to s.d.'s.

* ~3. Carnap's Anti-ban failure to conceive of all of lang. as reducible to observ-sentences that refer. to sensorg experience, which would be paradoxical anyway. Essence of s.d. is to be experienced.

4. by argument (as Ayer does in Arg. from Illus.)

* ~4. ∴(~3) ∃ s.d. can't be estab. by arg. since essence of s.d. is not linguistic but experiential.

Review: (~1∧~2) ∴ 3∨4, but both (3∧4) are contrary to ontol thesis, i.e., even if 3∨4 successful, neither can estab. s.d. as ontol. entity

---

~4 = ~(Ayer's Arg from Illus.) in depth:

Ref. arg. in append. Ayer's Arg from Illus (see my appended sheet for in-depth present)

(A,B) 1. Our D.E. ≡ (indisting. in logical character) V.E.

E.g.

visually indisting ≡

D.E. = straight stick in refracting solution

V.E. = bent stick in non-refracting solution

(both visually identical to holograph of V.E.)

(C) 2. In D.E.'s what we dir. exper. is always an S.d.

bent stick

Sit. C

straight stick out of solution

Sit. A

Straight stick / thing looks bent in refracting solution

Sit. B

a. let straight stick = x, and same bent stick = Δx

b. We know ~(x ∧ Δx)

c. but in sit A ∧ sit B (notably B) we sense (see) S.Th

d. What we sense in both cases (notably B) must be called s.th, call it 'S.d.'

∴ e. (Given that all D.E.'s have same log. char. argued for elsewhere ✓)

In D.E. we always dir. exper S.d.

1,2 3. In all sensory exper (V.E. ∧ D.E.) we always dir exper. S.d.

(D) 4. What we dir. per. in D.E.'s is not (never in D.E.'s all ident log. char, arg's for elsewhere) a material thing.

since a. Percept (m) dep's on subj.
b. m indep of subj.
c. Percept (m) ≠ m

1,4 5. We never (in D.E.'s ∧ V.E.'s) dir. exper a material thing

3,5 *6. What we exper is always an s.d. and never a material thing = we are per. conc. to s.d. = (Σ)

Austin's Criticism of Ayer's Arg from Illus (~ 4)

Distinctions Ayer is making are just linguistic, not real (ontol.)

Austin defines: delusion = a disordered belief (dep. on subj.)

illusion = deceptive appearance of public (indep of subj) (real) phenom.

~∃ a real (ontol.) s.th. that presents a deceptive appearance ∧ that is dep. on subj.

≡ (dep. on subj. ∧ unreal) (delus.) (X) exclusive 'or' (indep of subj. ∧ real) (illus.)

≡ There's nothing w/ char of s.d. (real ∧ dep. on subj.

$\therefore$ $\sim(3. \wedge 5.)$ of Ayer's Arg from Illus.

$= \sim 6. =$ We're not per. cont. to s.d.

$= \sim ② =$ (by $(\sim ⑯ \rightarrow \sim ⑲)$) =

if we're not per. cont. to c.d., then <u>there are no s.d.</u>!

bent stick e.g. is case of <u>illusion</u>, NOT dependent on subj. / mirage is a case of delusion and is NOT real. (implication: $\sim \exists$ any phenom that is real that is dep. on subj.)

Tyler's: Arg. from Illusion (Foundations of Empirical Knowl.)

subarg (A) Continuous variance of veridical experience (E.g. walk at K rate towards obj. ∴ V.E. of size ∈ obj Δs)

⇉ (has same log. character form as)

" " " delusory experience (E.g. Contin. vary lighting in which obj per.)

V.E. ∧ D.E both differ in degree in same way

subarg B)
- ⓐ actual crooked stick in non-refractory liquid
- ⓑ straight stick bent in H_2O
- ⓐ = ⓑ look alike (& diff.)
- ⓐ // ⓑ diff in belief but belief grounded in past 'normal' exper.

so ⓐ // ⓑ only in ref. to other experiences further ∃(V,D) D.E. believed to be V.E. (mirages) and V.E. " " " D.E. (strange exps could dream) i.e. ∃(V,D) ~~for~~ D.E. ≡ V.E.

(V,D) | ∅ intrinsic diff. in kind V.E. // D.E.

subarg C) 1) there are ∃ sensory deliriums (e.g.'s)
2) C.S. assume obj. x doesn't change (despite Δ appearance)
3) we 'sense' a change (Δx)
4) we know ~(x ∧ Δx)
5) we do have an exper. of Δx / we sense Δx | we don't have an experience of nothing
6) need to refer to Δx as sim, call it s.d.
7) ∃ exper. (x)

D) 1) MI exper (V+D) 'ext' + 'int' conditions

2) Δ condit ⇒ Δ percept (M)
but not conv
Δ percept ⇏ Δ conditions
(e.g. want to perceive x diff.ly; but don't Δ lighting etc..., x doesn't change)

3) C.S. M exist indep. of subj.,
M same across subj.

4) (¬3) percept (M) not dependent of subj.
percept (M) diff acc. subj.

3,4 5) percept (M) ≠ M, i.e. we never directly perceive a material thing.

Combining conclns (A... D)

MAIN ARGUMENT

1) A ∧ B V.E. ∧ D.E differ in degree but not in kind

2) D: we never exper. a material thing directly

3) C.S extended: we always have an experience of sth.

2,3,C 4) we always directly exper. s.d.

---

* 2,4 5) 2 ∧ 4 ✓

(B) Phenomenological Critique of T.E.

Motivation: Similar in relevant respects to Austin's motivation (defla. of Lewis, paradox.)

Phenom. Concept. of T.E.'s position:

Ph': dir inspection = analysis of Perceptual Consciousness. / T.E. falls into 2 Groups: Discursive theorists (where s.d temporally distinct and precedes the interpretive element); Sensory-Core Theorist (where s.d. is a constituent of the interpretive element, as in Lewis); in either case T.E. divides percept Conc. into Given (s.d.) and interpretive elements, by a faulty method: direct inspection.

Phenom. Concept. of problem w/ T.E.'s position:

T.E. holds that we're per. confined to s.d., but Ph holds we're only per conf. to s.d. sometimes, sometimes we per. p.o. directly. Since there is only 1 phenomenon (a unary relation between Seer and Seen = Per. Consc.) T.E. is mistaken that there are 2 elements as above (s.d., interpretive).

T.E.



Phenom's Strategy for criticizing T.E.'s position:

$\exists$ s.d.'s = T

~ 1b), ~[(we are per. cont. to s.d.'s) = T]

∴ ph. must reject 1b.

(does not hold as Austin ~~pos.~~ $\exists$ s.d. → per. cont s.d otherwise proving ~(per cont. to s.d.'s) would destroy the Ph thesis $\exists$ s.d.'s)

Also. Stage II problem of T.E. dissolves by fact that: O.p.w. = (is in a unary rela w/) subj
$\exists$ never s.th. behind which we per. which we cannot know (bing also an sich's)
we per. p.o.'s sometimes
per. p.o. $\subseteq$ per. s.d.'s

Phenom's Argument // T.E. in detail:

(Firth – in partic)

1. Physio. Fallacy – T.E. preconceives phenomen as divided into sensory channel's, and in a element by exper. demon. That partic states of P.C. determ. 1) by sensation 2) by interpretation (pure exper + present interest

(cp. Natural Epist. who, altho not exactly T.E.'s, hold $\exists$ 2 ele's, the pumping of phys. stim on sense organ $\equiv$ s.d. and the interpretation (= brain).)

2. The ostensible object fallacy

[s.d = surface of (p.o.)] = F   stays the same

But $\exists$ cases where ([surf. (p.o.) = k $\wedge$ s.d. Δ's]

$\wedge$ [(s.d. = k) $\wedge$ surf (p.o.) Δ's]) = covariance

∴ [s.d. $\not\equiv$ surf (p.o.'s)]

3. perceptual reduction fallacy

[The T.E.'s meθ of attending to what we per. is the same as the ph's exam. of P.C. (in inspect of P.C.)] = F

The T.E.'s meθ is a ~~per.~~ reduction of phenom

1. T.E. first p.r.'s and then tried to reveal P.C. by dir. inspection.
2. but T.E. fails at 1., since ~~per~~ attending analytically to ones P.C. per. reduces + transforms the original phenom. (the presentation).

The p.r. transformation is primarily one of dividing P.C. into a ele's. T.E. firstly attends to 'sid ele.'

4. ~~Fails~~ Exposure Hypoθ

T.E.'s per. of phenom thru p.r. as just sid ⊆ P.C. / partic. T.E.'s attitude of doubt's (1 among an infinity of attitudes arbitrarily chosen) p.r. ⊆ P.C. which contains the doubt + obj. of doubt.

(C) ~~[illegible]~~ Comparison and Evaluation of A + Ph Critiques:

(1) Both misunderstand, somewhat, the T.E. project:

1. Both are convinced that the paradoxicality of the result of the T.E. Inquiry must be resolved. Both have sense T.E. must be wrong, + set out to discover how it is not right.

(2) 2. Both misconceive T.E.'s position:

A
a. Austin holds T.E. hold's s.d.'s are ontol. entities
T.E. does not assert s.d.'s are ontol. entities

b. Austin char. T.E. as Cartesian Rep. when Lewis (a mod. T.E.) does not have a Cartesian (passive subj.) rep. at all.

Lewis' non-Cartesian Rep.



Ph.
a. ph. holds T.E. holds 1. T.E. attends to phenomena
~1. T.E. attends (say-I) to p.o.'s
2. T.E. confuses s.d. ≡ surf. (p.o.)
~2. T.E. discovers s.d. by exam. surf. (p.o.'s), but ~ assert that s.d. ≡ surf (p.o.)
3. ∃ T.E. confuse s.d. ≡ impinge phys stim s.d. surface
≠ T.E., but Note Epict.

b. Ph. misconceives meθ of T.E.'s inquiry

Ph. concept. ≠ T.E.'s inquiry

attend to detail of P.C.

1. T.E. bisects unary Phenom.



2. T.E. then interprets acc. to dissection.

Stg. by stg. exam., facets of which are analyzed + log. combined

Stg I 1a C≡ — O v.e. constit / (o.e. disting.

Ib. C≡ : abstract. common denom v.E., o.E., ~~generalize~~ universalize sit ∴ per cont to s.d.

Stg II C≡ ¦ [p.o.]

prob: how know o.p.w. on basis of Ib.?

---

(8) Problem w/ Austin and Ph.'s strategy for evaluating T.E.'s position

Austin: why ∃ s.d.'s → per cont. to s.d.'s?

Of course this follows from Cartesian Representation.

~~But~~ and the T.E. does, approximately, accept this;

But, Austin's analysis does not allow for the Ph. possibility. (| ∃ s.d. ∧ we're not per cont. to s.d.'s)

Ph's ∴ No slant prob. w/ strategy (given other mistakes, like inaccurately representing the nature of the T.E. inquiry)

D. Compar. & Evaluation of Austin's and Ph's Argum

Austin: Does Austin pretend to exhaust the possible methods of discovering s.d.'s? He gives no argument for this, only emphasizes that 4. is the T.E.'s main method (estab. of T.E. by Argument). But, this conception is not, strictly, the T.E.'s method (which involves argumentatively combining the results of each stage of Inquiry, which are discovered by attending carefully to what we're seeing). 'Attending carefully' is a type of observation, so Austin is wrong that refuting 4. (T.E. estab's s.d. by arg) refutes that ∃ s.d. And Austin's refutation of 1., 2. (observation method's of discovering s.d.'s fail) are not convincingly argued. Both the T.E. and Ph. apparently feel that, in some instances at least, s.d.'s may be discovered by method's of observation.

Austin's point: (~1.∧~2.), ∴ 3.∨4.; but 3, 4 both contrary to the ontol. thesis, therefore T.E. doesn't estab. ∃ s.d. by any of these 4 meth's, is wrong; it is based on the previously noted misconception that T.E. asserts s.d. have an ontol. status. To accept that T.E. pos. asserts s.d. have ontol. status would be to deny that Idealist and Solipsist solutions to T.E.'s Stg. II Q were possible and derived from the T.E. Stg. II dilemma. But this seems false.

The value of Austin's position:

Austin, I believe, *does* successfully refute 1b. of T.E.'s position by me(?) of Arg. (= Ayer).

See my attached eval. of Ayer's Arg.

Ayer establishes: we are per. cont. to s.d.
approx. ⟷ means: we perceive ⓐ (sub-Arg C) only s.d. ∧ ⓑ (sub-arg-D) what we per. is never a material thing.

But Austin, I assert, refutes Ayer's overall concl. in main Arg. *, by refuting that premise 5 (Sub Arg. C) and premise 2* (sub-arg. D) can be conjoined. The conclu (7) of Sub-Arg C is clearly an illusion (a phenom. independ of the subject, pub., and real, which presents at least 1 deceptive appearance) essentially b/c the e.g. (bent stick) + e.g.'s of same type is a deceptive appearance indep. of subj. But, the Conclu. 5 of D is established by asserting the 'perceived' is dependent on the subj. which makes the e.g.'s that provide evidence for this thesis delusions (like mirage). Now, since the essence of the e.g.'s that provide evidence for Sub-Arg C (independence of 'perceived' from subj.) is opposed to that for Sub-Arg D (dependence of 'perceived' on subject) To hold Sub-Arg C ∧ Sub-Arg D (= ⓐ ∧ ⓑ above) is a contradiction: the 'perceived' is both indep. from and dependent on the subject.

$\sim(ⓐ \wedge ⓑ) \rightarrow \sim$(we are (1b) per. cont. to s.d.)

By modus tollens: $\sim(1b) \rightarrow \sim\exists$ s.d.'s.

Now, I must qualify my assertion:
Austin can only estab $\sim\exists$ s.d.'s if 1)
(the T.E. must estab $\exists$ s.d.s by arg $\neq T \wedge$ 2)
($\exists$ s.d. $\rightarrow$ we're per cont. to them) $= T$

But I have shown both 1 + 2 to be doubtful.

~~Also~~ I should mention, the Austinian quibble that "there is bentness there" to describe the straight stick in retract sit. A sol, or bent in non-retr. sit B, really misses the point. The T.E. uses this locution provisionally, and although T that it is not a standard locution ("looks bent" is), whether or not the T.E. uses this locution has no bearing on the T.E. ~~proof~~ discovery that: we cannot distinguish whether the stick is straight or bent solely on the basis of what we perc. (sit A // sit B)

D.2 Evaluation of Phenomenologist's Arguments // T.

I refer to Ph's misconception of T.E's prob.
Also, a flagrant problem is the Ph's inability to distinguish V.E.s // D.E.'s

e.g.



where V.E $\wedge$ D.E. $\subseteq$ P.C.

Ph: direct insp. of our P.C. would reveal that D.E. seems illusory whereas V.E. didn't?

but what about the case where a halluc. machine sends an exper identical to V.E, including the realness, 'out-thereness' of the p.o.'s? How would Ph then disting V.E. // D.E?

T.E.'s point stands, we cannot know, on the basis of what we per. whether V.E. or D.E.

(E.) Comparative Evaluation of Ph ± Austin.

C.S., Ph., Ling.

Logical character of all C) // T.E. critiques same in certain respects,

1. Note both Ph + A attack a concln. of T.E. in Stg. I (Ph. attacks 1b; A attack 1a).

But, the C.S. dilation which motivates both Ph. + A. is a dilation of Lewis' response to the Stg. II T.E. Q: How can we poss. know O.P.W. solely on basis of what we per (only s.d.'s)? (To which Lewis paradoxically responds o.p.w. just is a certain logical hierarchical arrangem of s.d.'s.)

So both A + Ph. attack Stg. II (indirectly) by attack 1a. or 1b. of Stg. I (dirly).

But neither A. nor Ph. directly attack (1a) or (1b); they do so by analyzing cases of illusion (delusion) that T.E. typically takes to yield his paradoxical conclusions (1a), (1b). But this, alone, is not equivalent to analyzing the T.E.'s position. The T.E. generalizes, not universalizes the results of his surface inquiry.

Professor T. Clarke calls the investig. of the signif. of typical examples of illusion (delus.) as Mundane Epistemological Inquiry. He distinguishes MEI from universalization of results from the same inquiry: The (T.E.) or Philosophical Inquiry. Further, he asserts the logic character of the two types of inquiries is identical, except that the P.I. is a universalization of the former. If this is so, it follows that there are 2 stages of M.E.I. as there are 2 stages of P.I.

M.E.I.



← Ph: in sit A we see a p.o., in sit B we see an appearance of the p.o. (an s.d.), we can distng. by the 'realness' of the PC

T.E. cannot distng. A // B solely on basis of what per. (w/out running recess) but $x \neq x \wedge V.E(x) \exists D.E(x)$, so what we per in ea. case on H.D.

Angela: We see a straight stick looks bent (D.E.). We know this by examining, by lifting it out of sol.

But this situation is to be distinguished from the Philos. Inquiry stage I. where we are not arbitrarily presented w/ 2 identical appearances of 2 diff objs (a bent stick & a straight stick) but with n appearances.

Once we see that we cannot distinguish Sit A // Sit B solely on basis of what per., we should see that X, what the appearances of x really signify, could be anything. could be a hologram or could be a martian trick or could be a banana... We know absolutely nothing on the basis of what we perceive. But consider the complimentary situation where the same straight stick x, is put in a refracting + non refracting solution:

$X \equiv X \quad X \equiv X \quad X \equiv X \quad X \equiv X \ldots$

$V.E.(x) \not\equiv D.E.(x) \quad \not\equiv (x) \quad \equiv (x) \quad \not\equiv (x) \quad \not\equiv (x) \ldots$

M.E.I. situation

controversy centers around which locations fix the sit's (A), the diff. appearances of p.o.'s (+ conds's) (Ph)

In P.I. sit. X, the straight stick always is identical, but ∃ an infinity of poss. appearances (x), how is one to pick the 1 appearance that is veridical?

we have an idea of a straight stick from our ordinary experience but if we came from another planet and saw an infinity of appearances we would not be justified in believing ∃ straight stick than ∃ a vase in C.

II. OUTLINE Part II Question #2.

Part II Q 2. Lewis' phenomenalistic analysis of Reality, + the breakdown of this.

Outline:

A. The Breakdown in Lewis' Analysis

(note: I don't dir. answ. whether Lewis' Acct. of reality is correct; I hold that if Lewis' Analysis breaks down, then his account is incorrect)

1. Gen. Explan. and the biconditional.
2. Problem #1 Lewis' Biconditional is NOT a meaning Relation
3. Problem #2 modific. of Theis to sets of Beliefs
4. Problem #3 (Chisholm) single beliefs in p.o. can't entail (A→B)
5. problem #4 size of sets, irreducibility (Non-primacy) of sets, Lewis can't have vertical analysis

B. Significance of Lewis Analysis Breakdown on Contemporary Epistem: The Rise of the C.S. philosophers (or Mundane inquirers)

C. 7. Appended Note on Lewis' modified Theis

(A) The breakdown in Lewis' Analysis

Lewis answers stage II Q: How can it poss. be that we could know o.p.w. on basis of what we per. (per. cont. to s.d.)? Simply, all we mean by obj. reality obj.'s in o.p.w. is relations 1 per. exper (incln s.d.'s) has to another per exper. (incln s.d.'s) and other poss. per. exper. of highly form Action → eventuat

T.2. Q "what more do we believe when believe p.o. there versus just s.d.?"
Lewis: the more = other poss. (veritrable) s.d. experiences (.

Simply: non T.J. "There's a p.o. there" large set of T.J.'s

$$\left[\left(\text{belief in p.o.}\right) \longleftrightarrow \left(\underset{(s.d.)}{A} \rightarrow \underset{(s.d.)}{E}\right)\right]$$

Criticism: That one belief includes expectations may be due to empirical habituation and not meaning (log. equiv.) rela

(2) Problem #1

1. If move eyes to right (Action) then what I'm looking at should shift to left (eventuation).

2. I believe the thing/scene I'm looking at is really there (has objective reality) ↔ 1. (above)

3. But if rotating left at same rate shift eyes to right then ~1. (above)

(2) 4. But if ~1. → ~2.

a. (part A of 2.) belief in p.o ↔ A → E

b. ~1 = (A → E = F)

c. 2. ↔ (A →[1:] E)
T P is False

∴ ~A, i.e. relation between belief in p.o. and (A → E) is not a meaning relation

(3) Problem #2

But if conditions of (A → E) are specified A. is an equivalence (meaning) relation.

True. Then Lewis' thesis is modified to:

2, > sets of beliefs (norm incln. belief[set] about conditions) ↔ (A → E)

O.K. Typical: belief[set] in p.o. ∧ belief[set] in condition[relevant(?)]
↔ (A → E)

(4) Problem #3 (discovered by Chisholm)

* No single belief in P.O. or P.O. property itself implies, implied in all probability, or includes (A → E) expectations

- Chisholm objects & notates log. form of Lewis' entailment:

p = sentence (as belief in p.o.), a categorial stat.
r = a hypothetical statement
s = any statement whatsoever that is consistent w/ p:
such that $s \wedge p \rightarrow \sim r$

Then: ∃ such statements 's'

$$[((p \wedge s) \rightarrow \sim r) \rightarrow \sim (p \rightarrow r)]$$

$$[\sim((\text{bel} \cdot p \cdot o) \rightarrow (B \rightarrow E))]$$

Perhaps if add $\psi\phi$ statement that specifies observ. conditions then:

$$\psi\phi + [((p \wedge s) \rightarrow \sim r) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow r)]$$

(5) Problem #4

How large a set of beliefs is necess. for Lewis meaning implication to hold?

Quine: who holds from his excursions into set θ, that no one set reduces to another

ea. set of beliefs is equally comparable w/ s.d's
no one set more fundamental than other
hence can't ground beliefs

* can't have vertical analysis and reduction Lewis set's up, since above:

i.e.: ((((presentation ⊆ qualia) ⊆ property) ⊆ thing)
Lewis' vertical hierarchy won't work

(B.) Significance of Breakdown of Lewis' Analysis

Lewis' phenomenal empiricism is deflated by modification of his central paradoxical ($\sim$C.S.) idea: ['belief in p.o.' $\leftrightarrow$ (A $\to$ E)]

and by non-primacy of sets p.o. $\Downarrow$ A$\to$E

$\langle [(s.d. \subseteq A) \to (s.d. \subseteq E)], \ldots \equiv$ (bel. in p.o.)$\rangle$ doesn't work, if Quine is right

First Bi-furcation caused by breakdown of meaning equiv.

reject 'there are p.o's'
replace:
theoretic entities $\Leftrightarrow$ (A $\to$ E) ⇙

Quinians

1. since belief in p.o. not a meaning rela.

and

2. since belief in p.o. does not reduce to A $\to$ E, then to s.d's

consider belief in p.o. as postulative, predictive theoretic entity.

p.o. then is theoretic not ontologic

Very paradoxical

⇓ reject mode (A $\to$ E) (s.d.) (s.d.)
i.e. rej. s.d. doctrine

Other 'C.S.' philosophers

recog. 1., 2. as Quine
[but Quine's acct - too paradoxical.

If accept ($\exists$ s.d.'s $\wedge$ we're per cont. to s.d.(s))
$\to$ forced to Quine's account

$\therefore$ reject antecedent above

2nd Bifurcation

⇙ ⇓

Austinians
reject $\exists$ s.d.'s

Phenomenol'ts
hold $\exists$ s.d.'s $\wedge$
reject 'we're per cont. to s.d.(s)'

(C) Appended note of Lewis' modified thesis

The Lewisonian Conception of Reality is essentially relational.

But, paradoxically, Lewis maintains that knowledge of the object is relative to the knower and the object is independent of the knower.

The subject's relative knowledge is all we mean by objectivity.

Lewis explains the relation between the subject's relative knowledge and objectivity as follows:

Let A = an object (p.o.) e.g. a ball
Let X, Y = properties of the object (X = blue, Y = green)
Let R, S = conditions (o.p.w. environs of the p.o.)
R = white lighting S = yellow lighting

Then it's apparent:

what Chisholm calls the ϕϕ (psychophysical) statement

1. A is X relative to R
2. A is Y relative to S

} both of these judgements are relational and absolute

3. A is X
4. A is Y

} neither X nor Y is an absolute predicate of A.

Clarification:

1.+2. Given an object A, and it's spec. condition (R), the specifying property X is always a prop. of A.

or Given an object A has property X, it's condition R is determinate

or Given X a the property of some obj. A, given the spec. condit's R, the specific obj. A is absolutely knowable.

Thus, the subject's knowledge of an object is determinate, absolute, independent of any subject when the character of that knowledge is relational, and indeterminate non-absolute, dependent, when the character of that knowledge is predicative.

"The ball is green." is dependent upon what sort of light I'm sitting under.

But "the ball is green relative to a yellow lighting" cannot be denied, and is true whether I'm sitting under a yellow, white light or in the dark (possible experience).

This notion of 'relative absoluteness,' paradoxical as it is forms the mainstay of Lewis' theory of reality.